

## CHAPTER 22. VARIOUS MATTERS RELATING TO CHINA

## Section 1. The Policy towards China

## 1. Deciding on a Policy.

Regarding our policy towards China, "The Three Principles China Policy," dated October 4, Showa 10 (1935), and "An Outline for the Management of North China," dated January 13, Showa 11, (1936), had already been decided upon. However, as the result of several conferences, held since July between the authorities concerned in the Foreign, War and Navy Ministries, in connection and side by side with the "Diplomatic Policy of the Japanese Empire," decided on August 7, Showa 11 (1936), "Practical Measures towards China," (annex A) and "Outline for the Management of North China, No. 2" (annex B) and the appendix to the same were agreed upon on August 11 by the four Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, War and Navy, after being referred to the deliberations of the Emergency Commission.

## 2. Putting Forward the Decisions.

Accordingly, it was decided that officials in charge of the affair should be dispatched to China from the Foreign Ministry (Secretary UTA), the War Ministry (Lieut.-Colonel KAGESA) and the Navy Ministry (Commander NAKAMURA), in order to convey and make fully understood the gist of the above policy. By the order of the Foreign Ministry, Secretary UTA left Tokyo on August 14, attended the Chief Diplomats' Conferences and delivered the said policy at the Conferences, which were held successively at the Japanese Embassy at Hsinking (on August 17, 18, 19, 20); at the Japanese Consulate-general at Tientsin (on August 22, 23, 24, attended by Ambassador KAWAGOE, Consul-general at Tsinan, ARINO, Consul-general at Tsingtao, NISHI, Secretaries MUTO and HANAWA, Deputy Consul at Changchiakon, NAKANE, etc.) and at the Japanese Embassy at Shanghai (on August 27, 28, 29, attended by Consul-generals WAKASUGI, Shanghai; SUMA, Nanking; MIURA, Hankow, and NAKAMURA, Foo-chow).

## Annex A

Practical Measures for China (decided by the Ministries concerned on August 11, Showa 11, (1936).)

The measures to be taken for the present regarding the Japanese policy towards China, in accordance with the "Diplomatic Policy of the Japanese Empire," decided on August 7, Showa 11, (1936).

### 1. Measures for North China.

The main object of our policy towards North China lies in making the said area a special anti-communistic, pro-Japan-Manchukuo zone, as well as in rendering the area useful for acquisition of national defense resources and strengthening communication facilities; one, for preparation against the invasion of the Soviet Union and the other for laying the foundation for the realization of triple coalition and mutual assistance between Japan, Manchukuo and China. The above-mentioned pro-Japan-Manchukuo zone should ultimately include the five provinces of North China. But hasty attempts to enlarge the zone or to accomplish at a single stroke ideal decentralization of local governments will not only bring troubles and hinder the ultimate aim, but are also apt to contradict our intentions to secure advantages over the Soviet Union. We should first endeavor to accomplish gradually the decentralization of the Hopeh and Chahar Provinces, and as for the other three provinces, especially towards the Shantung Province, we should direct our main efforts towards bringing about anti-communistic, pro-Japanese sentiment and the triple economical coalition of Japan, Manchukuo and China. As regards the form of the decentralization, we should take care to obtain practical effect, without being scrupulous about formalities. Taking into consideration saving face of the Nanking government, it is decided advisable to have the Nanking regime recognize the decentralization of the North China provinces actually under the formality of authorization. (Ref. "Outline for the Management of North China, No. 2").

Our admission of the above-mentioned authorization of the Nanking government is intended as a political art for obtaining the largest possible result in the diplomatic negotiations with that Government. Therefore, in handling the matter, it is essential for our central government and dispatched organs to be united as one body, to take opportune measures, and, with resolute attitude, not allow the Chinese government to take advantage of the opportunity, and play a so-called "double policy."

### 2. Measures to deal with the Nanking Government.

Practical measures should be taken to expedite rapprochement between the Nanking government and Japan and to make it become gradually anti-Soviet. Particularly, we should make it so that it will become necessary for the Nanking Government to endeavor voluntarily to improve conditions in North China. In dealing with the matter, we should avoid, taking into consideration saving face of the Nanking government, such measures as would necessitate that government to resort to an anti-Japanese policy out of consideration for the people. We should take pains to execute such economic measures, making the people of China the object of our

policy, as would realize co-existence and co-prosperity realistically. Moreover, it is necessary, always keeping in mind a speedy realization of our North China policy, that we make it so that the Nanking government cannot avoid being dependent upon us by letting them profit if necessary. Such measures should not be taken, however, that would consolidate the foundations of the Nanking regime without first correcting its policy.

(1) Conclusion of an anti- comintern military pact.

a) A secret Specialists Commission composed of military experts of both countries should be organized to conclude this pact.

b) The object of the Specialists Commission is to confer on the range of enforcement of the anti-comintern pact, the content of the pact and the measures to be taken to attain these ends, etc.

(2) Conclusion of a Sino-Japanese military alliance.

With the object of concluding offensive and defensive alliance against the invasion of a third country, a secret specialists commission should be organized which should be composed of the same number of experts from Japan and China.

(3) For the acceleration of solution of the pending problems between Japan and China.

a) The employment of a supreme political advisor.

To make the National Government employ a Japanese supreme political advisor to participate in the important affairs of internal administration and diplomacy of the National Government.

b) The employment of military advisors.

To make the National Government employ Japanese military advisors and military instructors.

c) The opening of air-lines between Japan and China.

We expect prompt opening of air-lines between Japan and China. In order to accomplish this aim, measures should be taken to make the Nanking government comply with our proposal, by resorting to methods such as flights between Taiwan and Fukien and experimental flights between Shanghai and Fukuoka, etc. together with the establishment of a North China Aviation Company.

d) Conclusion of a Sino-Japanese reciprocal tariff agreement.

We expect prompt realization of a Sino-Japanese reciprocal tariff agreement, in accordance with the principles decided upon between the Ministries concerned regarding the abolition of special trade in East Ki-chow and the reduction of anti-Japanese high customs duties. In case of necessity, we should propose to China the organization of a Sino-Japanese joint specialists commission.

(4) Acceleration of Sino-Japanese economic coalition.

We expect the setting up of an inseparable relation between Japan and China which will not be influenced by the political situation in China by proceeding with economic plans such as would, with the people of China as the object of our purpose, bring about realistic Sino-Japanese co-prosperity.

It is not expected that the policies towards the Nanking government in this item should necessarily be brought to solution side by side and at the same time as our policies towards North China as given in the previous item. They should be solved by elastic measures suitable to the occasion. And in handling the matter, organization of the Nanking government and its political parties as well as its personnel elements should be adjusted, if necessary.

3. Measures towards other Local Governments.

The prime object of our policies towards local governments is to extend our prestige by making them pro-Japanese and thus causing the Nanking Government to change its attitude towards Japan. Accordingly, we should not adopt such policy as would be of assistance to any local governments in bringing about unification or bringing about segregation.

Under the above-mentioned principles, the measures to be taken towards local governments are as follows:

(1) Economic invasion into South China. (for instance, development of resources in the provinces of Fukien, Canton and Kuanghsi, Canton-Swatoow railway connection, Japan-Siam air service, Fu-Chow-Taihoku air service, etc.)

(2) Investigations into the outlying districts (dispatch of resources, investigation expeditions to Suchuan, Kansu, Hsin-chiang, Chinghai, etc.)

4. Regarding Inner Mongolia.

We should help establish a Mongolia for the Mongolians, with the object of adjusting relations with the Soviet Union, which stands on a basis of friendly relations with Japan and Manchukuo. It is desirable that we handle the matter as secretly and implicitly as possible and take care to maintain harmony with our policies towards the Soviet Union, Manchukuo and China.



## ANNEX B

An Outline for the Management of North China, No. 2, (decided between the Ministries concerned on August 11, Showa 11 (1936))

## Prime Object.

1. The prime object in handling North China is to help accomplish the decentralization of local governments for the benefit of the local people; to construct a steady anti-communistic, pro-Japanese zone; to facilitate Japan's acquisition of national defense resources as well as enlarged means of communications, so as to be well prepared for Soviet's anticipated invasion, and also to pave the way for the realization of the Japan-Manchukuo-China coalition.

2. For achievement of the above-mentioned, it will be necessary for Japan, besides giving confidential guidance to the local governments, to have the Nanking (Central) government recognize the speciality of North China, and voluntarily give the North China government a special and inclusive decentralized power, instead of restraining the decentralization of North China.

## General Policy.

## 1. Substance of Decentralization.

The substance of decentralization lies in having the North China government exercise substantial power in finance, industry, communication and other general matters, not to be influenced by any anti-Japanese movements by the Nanking government or any other sources in political and economic activities directed towards bringing about the peace and welfare of the people and towards the realization of the Japan-Manchukuo-China coalition. Especially, actions which might be construed as if Japan's object consists in denying the sovereignty of China in that area, or in helping establish an independent state separate from the Nanking Government, or else in realizing the extension of Manchukuo, should be strictly avoided.

## 2. Area of Decentralization.

Although we have North China's five provinces in view as our ultimate objective, we will first do our best in bringing about brighter conditions in the Hopeh and Chahar<sup>1</sup> provinces (economic development and stabilization of public sentiment) as well as the complete decentralization of these provinces, because it is not advisable for us to be too eager for hasty expansion of the area.